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 This paper extends the work that was presented earlier in Druid Society Conference 2014, Copenhagen, June 16
th
-
18
th
, Copenhagen Business School, DK as Piirainen, K.A:, Lähteenmäki-Smith, K., Raivio, T., Yi-Lin, J., Alkærsig, L. 2014. 
An Exploratory Account of Incentives for Underexploitation in an Open Innovation Environment. 
Abstract 
This paper presents an empirical account of a phenomenon that we refer to as the ‘reverse tragedy of the 
commons’ in open innovation. The name signifies the ‘under-exploitation’ of intellectual property under 
weak appropriability. The name is this graphic because the tragedy is costly, and can also render 
intellectual property effectively worthless and block innovation in the short to medium term. We propose 
that the tragedy is borne out of the interaction between enterprise characteristics, a competitive setting 
and the framework that is set by the policy intervention. This finding is pertinent to policy makers with 
regard to the design of research, development and innovation instruments, as well as managers who must 
determine how to implement open practices in innovation. 
1 Introduction 
Innovation is high on the agenda in public policy (European Commission 2014) as well as private 
strategizing. As various policy instruments, such as research, development and innovation (RDI) funding 
programs, are developed, there is a discussion on the interactions between and externalities of instruments 
within ‘policy mixes’ (Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja 2011; Paraskevopoulou 2012).  
To inform this discussion, this paper presents an exploratory empirical account of a phenomenon that we 
refer to as the ‘reverse tragedy of the commons.’ ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968; Hardin 1998) 
proposes that that public goods2 or commons are bound to be overexploited and depleted, because the 
negative externalities of exploitation  are collectively borne by all stakeholders while the individual 
exploiters bear the benefits (Hardin 1968; Hardin 1998). The ‘reverse tragedy of the commons’ happens 
when stakeholders under-exploit a common resource. We propose that this under-exploitation results from 
the properties of public goods and incentives for commercialization. We focus on the exploration of the 
reverse tragedy and its implications. The empirical account is from a publicly funded center of expertise 
program established to bridge the gap between research and innovation. The program had exceptional 
conditions for intellectual property (IP), which makes the program a laboratory to examine behaviors in 
low-appropriability regimes.  
This paper offers two main contributions. First, it outlines a new phenomenon important for innovation 
research, specifically  the discussion on the relationship between the external environment and benefits to 
Open Innovation (OI) (Huizingh 2011; Dahlander and Gann 2010). The observed reverse tragedy poses a 
challenge for effective collaboration. We propose that this under-exploitation is driven by a set of factors 
that are associated with the sharing of public goods, including organizational incentives, trust, the 
coopetitive setting, and the framework set by the policy intervention. Second, this study explores the 
challenges for OI policy instruments, thus contributing to the discussion on policy instruments and mixes. It 
identifies a potential contradiction between the intended outcomes of innovation policy and the actual 
behavior of firms in OI. Additionally, the research has some implication for management, as discussed 
below. 
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 Public goods (commons) are resources that are non-rival and non-excludable, i.e., that cannot be excluded from 
public consumption and individual consumption does not exclude others from consuming the resource (Samuelson 
1954) 
2 The literature review 
This section discusses the theoretical perspectives on competitive advantage and innovation to provide a 
theoretical lens for analysis (c.f. Dubois & Gadde 2002). First, we examine the relationship between the 
tragedy of commons and IP as a source of competitive enterprise advantage. Second, we discuss the so-
called first-mover advantage and the incentives for the commercial exploitation of public goods. 
2.1 Tragedy of commons, knowledge assets and competitive advantage 
As discussed, the tragedy of the commons is the theoretical proposition that an ‘unmanaged’ commons is 
depleted by over-exploitation because (short-term) individual incentives increase the exploitation of the 
resource until consumption is unsustainable (Hardin 1998). However, there is evidence that such a tragedy 
is not a given and that commons may even be ‘under-exploited’ (Feeny et al. 1990).  
The literature on commons debates whether higher education institutions serve as a common pool  (e.g., 
Ostrom & Hess 2007; Madison et al. 2010; Frischmann 2005). Also the effects of patent pools or thickets 
(Lerner and Tirole 2008) as well as patents as anti-commons have been discussed (e.g., Chang and Yang 
2008; Murray and Stern 2007). We take a new perspective and specifically examine the commercial 
exploitation of IP that is created in collaborative research projects and has very low appropriability. 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) posits that the competitive advantage of an enterprise is built on 
proprietary resources, which include intangible assets that range from registered IP, (intellectual property 
rights, IPR) and trade secrets to routines, processes and know-how (Winter 2003). The RBV proposes that at 
any given time, the competitive position or advantage of an enterprise is based on unique resources (e.g., 
Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Further the dynamic capabilities enable the recognition, acquisition and 
configuration of unique resource bundles for exploitation (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997; Teece 2007; 
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Winter 2003; Danneels 2008), for example through RDI or networking 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). 
Arguably public information may create value when it is exploited by an enterprise with superior 
capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Winter 2003; Danneels 2008). However, this means accelerated 
competitive imitation and learning (Peteraf 1993) and low appropriability requires high capabilities (Ahn et 
al. 2016). While collaboration may be generally beneficial (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon 2008), it is difficult 
not to transfer knowledge in intensive collaboration (Bresser 1988).   
In this view, exploiting public goods creates a basic tension between the interest to create economic rents 
and sharing the knowledge for a common good. However, an enterprise may be compelled to share 
information if the probable return is greater than the probable damage (Simeth and Raffo 2013). Such 
incentive might be risk sharing or the possibility of tapping into new complementary assets (Enkel, 
Gassmann, and Chesbrough 2009). Arguably collaborators also have a better ability to absorb and use the 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) than outsiders.  
2.2 First-mover advantage and competition 
The first-mover advantage (FMA) is the proposition that the first enterprise to introduce a new product 
category to a new market holds a significant and sustained advantage over the followers in market share 
and investment return. For consumer goods, it is held that preferences are shaped by the first innovator 
around its offering, which creates a ‘lock-in’ effect (Robinson, Kalyanaram, and Urban 1990).  
However, often the first mover does not hold an advantage, but rather the early follower (Golder and Tellis 
1993). The probability of gaining FMA is higher in stale markets with slow technology progress. If 
technology changes fast, then FMA is less likely as each successive product generation poses the risk for the 
pioneer. When markets are changing fast, FMA is also less likely as customer base and preferences also 
change fast (Suarez and Lanzolla 2007). Teece (1986) proposed that when information approaches being a 
public good, the benefits from knowledge tend to shift for enterprises with ‘complementary assets’, which 
may translate into an incumbents’ advantage (Rothaermel 2001). Other studies have shown that 
uncertainty on returns may either contract or expand RDI investments (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon 2008); 
low RDI cost may induce a ‘race’ to be the pioneer, while high cost may lead to a ‘waiting game’ to seek the 
second-mover advantage (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube 2001).  
2.3 Synthesis 
The existing research proposes that sustained competitive advantage is based on a stock of resources and 
dynamic capabilities to acquire, configure and exploit the resources to create value. In this scheme IP is an 
important resource. Further, to remain competitive, enterprises must replenish their resources ahead of 
their immediate competition and use their capabilities to reconfigure them.  
The research on competitive advantage silently assumes that enterprises seek to compete and 
outmaneuver each other either directly or by diversification and that over-exploitation is the logical end of 
the development. However, there is a tension between the assumptions and the data that are presented 
below. As the literature review also suggests, there are incentives whereby it may appear to be more 
rational to refrain from engaging in RDI, which may to ‘under-exploitation’ of assets.  
The anticipated return to RDI investment and the commercial rationality of such an investment depends on 
the ability to harvest rents from the markets. As discussed above, the initial innovator often cannot reap 
significant rents. Consequently, when the (possibility of) competition prohibits rents, market leaders may 
displace themselves voluntarily from leadership (Pacheco-de-Almeida 2010). The aversion towards 
innovation is exaggerated by high RDI costs, as innovation may be perceived as a costly journey to the same 
competitive situation (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube 2001).  
3. Methodology  
3.1 Study design 
This study is an exploratory case study research. We derive propositions from  ‘critical’ cases, that serve as 
a basis for analytic generalization (Patton 1990; Yin 2003). The analysis is based on the matching of the 
observations to theoretical concepts through systematic combination (Dubois and Gadde 2002; Dubois and 
Gadde 2014). In practice, there is an interplay between theory development and data analysis in the act of 
pattern matching to draw proposals for causal inference.  
Specifically, we examine two ‘Strategic Centers of Science Technology and Innovation’ (SHOKs3). The SHOK 
program was an excellent opportunity to examine the phenomenon of commercialization of public IP, as it 
had an exceptional scale and included the main actors of the respective industries within the Finnish 
national economy. The data were gathered between May and September 2012 during an evaluation of the 
SHOK program. The data collection was executed by a consortium of researchers and consultants.  
The dominant sampling logic for data collection was purposive (Palys 2008). The interviewees were 
selected from the stakeholders based on their assumed ability to give informed answers. The interviewees 
included SHOK CEOs and CTOs and their equivalent; representatives of funding bodies; researchers, RDI 
managers, and employees from the collaborative projects; and policy makers who were involved in the 
design and implementation of the program. The survey was conducted as a part of the evaluation, and in 
the context of this paper, it is primarily used for context. The data have been re-examined and re-coded for 
the purposes of this paper.  
Table 1: Details of data 
Data source Sampling and collection Coding and interpretation 
Documents A document database of annual reports, monitoring 
data and other relevant materials from the SHOKs. 
The data were coded by each 
responsible SHOKs investigator. 
Description of each SHOKs output, 
form and context. 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
A series of interviews with SHOK personnel, 
participants of the research programs and 
stakeholders. 
The interviews were semi structured, administered 
either at the interviewees premises/place of work or 
over the phone and noted in field notes. 
Interviews were conducted until data saturation was 
reached, between May and September 2012 
 
The data were coded by each 
responsible SHOKs investigator. 
Bottom-up coding to emerging 
themes 
A cross-sectional panel 
survey 
The survey explored the expectations, perceptions and 
experiences with the SHOK instrument among the 
involved companies and research organizations.  
A pre-test was done between the June 1st and 4th, 
and implemented between June 11th and the 29th.  
The surveys for participants and program 
administrators received 1580 (27% response rate) and 
676 (25% response rate) answers, respectively. 
 
Survey analyzed by core team of 
evaluators. Cross SHOK-findings on 
outputs and the program in general. 
Group interviews A series of group interviews conducted during a series Independent expert judgment on 
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 SHOK is a Finnish acronym, from ‘Strategisen Huippuosaamisen Keskittymä,’ literally Center of Strategic 
Expertise/Excellence. 
of peer review panel meetings. 
The interviews were led by the five-person panels 
composed of leading academics in the fields of the 
SHOKs. 
The interviewees were SHOK program managers and 
participants.  
 
the SHOKs research quality and 
implementation in general.  
3.2 Empirical context4 
3.2.1 Background and overview to program output  
The founding of the SHOK program was prepared 2005-2006. The aim of the program was to establish 
public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation and renewal of industries.  The SHOKs were designed 
to be OI platforms to bridge the continuum from basic research to innovation and exploitation. The 
program was expected to create new patterns of cooperation, co-creation and interaction.  
There were six SHOKs in operation: CLEEN Ltd (in the area of environment and energy), FIMECC Ltd (in the 
machinery industry), SalWe Oy (in health and wellness), DIGILE (in the ICT and digital services sector, 
previously known as TIVIT) RYM Ltd (in the built environment sector) and the Finnish Bioeconomy Cluster 
FIBIC Ltd (forest-based industry, previously the Forest Cluster Ltd.). 
The SHOK program became one of the main instruments of Finnish innovation policy and perhaps even its 
‘flagship’ program in its runtime. From September 2008 through September 2012, Tekes funded the SHOKs 
and their programs with a total of over EUR 343 million. An average of 40% of the research that was 
conducted in the SHOKs was co-funded by the involved companies.  
The evaluation of the program found that most of the SHOKs largely failed to achieve the program 
objectives (Lähteenmäki-Smith et al. 2013). Measured by the program’s Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
and the participants’ experiences and satisfaction, the impact of the SHOKs was relatively low. The 
activities produced relatively few commercial outputs, and the objective for creating new business was only 
partly met. In terms of specific IP issues, Overall, the conclusion was that the then-current combination of 
actors and program conditions did not provide sufficient incentive for commercialization.  
Particularly the commercialization activities were relatively modest. The highest achiever in terms of the 
number of invention announcements and secured patents, the FIBIC reported a total of 34, while the 
highest number of licenses that were sold was reported by the FIMECC was 46. Extremely few spin-offs 
were reported, FIMECC was the “best-in-class” with three. In the survey, the participants were asked about 
the effect of SHPOK to IPR creation, Cleen represented the most positive picture, with 30% having felt an 
impact in these terms, while the fraction for TIVIT/DIGILE was 25%, and for FIBIC a mere 11%.  
Due to these findings, the stakeholders who were interviewed were asked about IP regime, and 
consistently stated that the T&C were adequate, well-defined and clearly communicated. Critical views 
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 Adapted and reinterpreted from (Lähteenmäki-Smith et al. 2013) and associated secondary data.  
were expressed though by some interviewees, the panels, as well as the survey.  Similarly over 50% of the 
surveyed across all SHOKs indicated that IPR issues were not sufficiently resolved and that was reflected in 
the output, incidentally in FIBIC the number was 80%. 
3.2.2 Terms and Conditions for the Coercive Open Innovation Regime 
One of the distinguishing features of the SHOK program was the IP regime. During the data collection 
period, all of the research programs used Tekes funding. Thus, the Tekes general terms and conditions 
(T&C, “General Terms and Condition for SHOK Research Programme Funding” 2012) outline the framework 
conditions.  
The T&C in effect established a coercive OI regime. While the ownership and title as well as material and 
immaterial rights to any results materials and IP remained with the inventor, who could also protect the IP, 
the T&C mandated an unlimited and perpetual access right to any resulting material and IPR to all of the 
participants within the respective research programs, including any entities within the same group of 
companies. If participants left the program, their access right to IPR would remain in force, but they would 
lose preferential treatment in access to background or resulting materials that were owned by other 
participants.  
4 Case Descriptions 
We chose two of the six SHOKs, Finnish Bioeconomy Ltd. (FIBIC) and DIGILE Ltd., for further analysis for the 
following reasons: First, they were the longest running SHOKs, and FIBIC has represented forest-based 
industries since 2007 and DIGILE IT and telecom since 2008. Second, at the time of the data collection, the 
research programs were large (up to 4 years in duration and budgeted up to EUR 20 million annually), and 
they included a broad-based coopetitive (up to 20 participants) consortia.  
4.1 Case A: FIBIC 
FIBIC (Finnish Bioeconomy, orig. Forestcluster Ltd.) was founded in 2007 as the first SHOK to renew the 
forest industry through new RDI networks. As with other SHOKS, FIBIC has a Strategic Research Agenda, 
which is implemented by collaborative research programs (c.f., Lähteenmäki-Smith et al. 2013).  
The forest industry is a mature industry that is dominated by multinational companies. The key challenges 
in the forest industry are related to the profitability of the industry, renewal, and research reorientation. 
The programs produced business ideas, invention disclosures, publications and patents. However, the 
utilization of the results was seen as being highly problematic due to the blanket license to IP across the 
consortium. Further, there was clear evidence that, due to the obligation to share results, the most 
commercially lucrative research topics were not included in the programs. 
Besides IPR issues (c.f. Table 2), the first tier forest conglomerates were reluctant to commercialize as the 
market demands were unclear, which together halted innovation. The lower-tier chemical and equipment 
suppliers could not exploit the IP either because their customers in the first tier were not interested. These 
findings correspond well with the description of the reverse tragedy of the commons, which is enabled by 
very low appropriability of IP. Multiple factors exacerbated the issue as the technology was moving 
relatively fast, the markets were highly volatile or unknown, the RDI costs were high, and the enterprises 
were, on average, well resourced. 
Table 2: Summary on interviews 
Informant/source Statements relevant IPR, incentives 
and commercialization 
Emerging themes 
Large forest enterprises 
 Once a research program is running, how 
does one spin out common IPR? These 
difficulties may prove critical, as 
companies want to have results for 
themselves 
 Truly interesting research done by 
companies themselves 
 Fierce rivalry for best research resources 
 IPR issues blocking research ideas 
 IPR is underutilized/exploited 
 Lack of commitment 
 Avoiding truly interesting topics in 
research programs 
 
Chemical and equipment suppliers 
 SHOK concept is less efficient than 
expected 
 Real development is not brought into 
FIBIC, only elsewhere 
 IPR issues a bottleneck No1. Common 
ownership of results does not work. 
 Lack of general commitment, as the 
concept must be sold internally to top 
management each year.  
 Too much openness hinders 
commercialization 
Academia 
 They do not see the IPR as an issue  
 Protection by publishing [which in fact 
exacerbates the challenges] 
 Companies do not bring topics relevant to 
competitive edge into FIBIC 
FIBIC 
 Cartel history is a significant source of 
challenges in the level of cooperation 
 Companies are reluctant to tell what they 
really do 
 IPR issues, free license to utilize does not 
work  
 The step from research program to 
company based activities is difficult 
Panel meetings, five senior 
researchers, interviewing SHOK 
managers, program directors, 
researchers and boards members in 
separate sessions. (20 interviewees 
plus 5 panelists) 
 Unclear how to move from pre-
competitive to competitive research 
objectives within the SHOK 
 The IPR issues are unresolved 
4.2 Case B: DIGILE 
At the time of the data collection, DIGILE (orig. TIVIT) ran six programs with large and small enterprises and 
research institutes. The challenge was also the reinvention of business models for Finnish IT and telecom. 
The industry structure was similar, although there was a more clear distinction between a few large 
technology-driven enterprises and small, typically service-oriented enterprises. 
The first finding is that the DIGILE programs produced relatively little IPR compared to previous similar 
public RDI interventions. The preceding Tekes run RDI subsidy program produced orders of magnitude 
more  IPR for the equivalent funding and runtime (Lähteenmäki-Smith et al. 2013, 186). The main 
explanation was that the bulk of the RDI activities took place in the pre-commercial and pre IPR registration 
phase. However, the DIGILE documents and the interviewees indicated that the programs were focused on 
innovation as opposed to pre-commercial research.  
The circumstances surrounding the DIGILE programs are analogous to that of FIBIC. Similarly, technology 
moves fast, markets are volatile, RDI costs are high, and several well-resourced enterprises are involved. 
However, in DIGILE, we cannot find as clear-cut case of the reverse tragedy of the commons. This is 
arguably because of faux-collaborative behaviors in the programs (c.f. Table 3). The interviews suggest that 
the programs exhibited  nominal investment in a program and staffing the collaborative projects with 
second-tier RDI employees to acquire interesting IPR, and private parallel development projects. These 
findings reinforce the notion that the coercive OI regime poses incentive problems. 
Table 3: Summary on interviews 
Informant/source Statements relevant IPR, 
incentives and 
commercialization 
Emerging themes 
DIGILE  
 Programs have a position in creating 
platforms/scalable ecosystems 
 IPRs less sensitive as activities focused 
outside daily business 
 IPRs are more sensitive for small-to-
medium enterprises (SMEs) 
 The T&C that set-up a coercive open 
innovation regime pose perverse 
incentives for IPR and 
commercialization 
 Sensitive for SMEs, due to narrow IPR 
base, and for large enterprises due to 
the risk unwanted spill overs 
 Competing interests for research 
agenda and coopetitive relationships 
amplify the IPR issue 
 
Funding organizations 
 It is suggested that the programs serve 
as a venue for idea exchange and RDI is 
done privately 
 There is a risk that large (multinational) 
enterprises gather IPRs and spread 
them around 
Large enterprises 
 T&C for IPR is challenge for committing 
enterprises 
 The T&C are a strong disincentive for 
contributing to the RDI, the present 
terms do not allow any appropriability 
 The model does not handle competing 
interests in the consortium 
 The terms inhibit especially SME 
participation 
RDI director and SHOK program 
participants (2 persons), SME software 
and service 
 Large enterprises dominate the 
agenda, every participant have their 
own agendas, programs are focused on 
things that would not be developed 
otherwise (non-core RDI) 
 Freeloading is common (participating 
organizations commit in name only) 
 Commercialization is challenging duo 
to the joint venture –nature of RDI 
Academia 
 The SHOKs operate uncomfortably 
close to commercialization; enterprises 
do not share their best ideas and 
efforts  
 IPRs are a constant source of friction in 
the programs 
Panel meetings, five senior researchers, 
interviewing SHOK managers, program 
directors, researchers and boards 
members in separate sessions. (20 
interviewees plus 5 panelists) 
 The panel concluded, based on 
hearings, that IPR registration and not 
creation was substantially hampered 
by mandatory IPR sharing 
 
4.3 Cross Case Analysis  
These findings suggest that a coercive OI regime introduces perverse incentives for IPR creation and/or 
commercialization. In the case of DIGILE, the incentive problem seems to manifest as lack of created IP, 
whereas in FIBIC the manifestation is lack of commercialization. 
The first plausible explanation for the difference is the balance of power in the programs. Several of the 
FIBIC programs involve large multinationals that compete in their core business areas, together with their 
mutual suppliers and technology partners. The major driver for the reverse tragedy is the coopetitive 
relationship and the resulting FMA problem. The more moderate instance of the tragedy in the DIGILE case 
can be attributed to behaviors to circumvent the IPR problem and the fact that there were less direct 
competitors in the programs.   
Another difference between the SHOKs may be the general perception of risk. First, the technology and 
product and/or service cycles are shorter, and new businesses are created more often in IT compared to 
forest-based industries. Second, risk magnitude is different, for example, comparing the programs Future 
Biorefinery (FIBIC) and Future Innovative Services (DIGILE), the investment in commercializing the concepts 
differs by two or more orders of magnitude.  
Based on these findings, we argue that the program features are one facet of the explanation, as the 
coopetitive setting with the OI regime creates disincentives for commercialization. As the consortium 
members have unlimited access to IPR, the possibility of escalating competition and the resultant risk 
inhibit innovation. Further, although IPR transfer ‘at a market price’ is possible, to buy out competitors, 
appropriability is already compromised and determining the price is difficult.  
As discussed above, the FMA depends on market and technology change, and any first mover faces a high 
risk of failing altogether and bears the significant cost of attempting to create a market. In the case of FIBIC 
the industry is mature, which might indicate a ‘stale’ market where FMA would be attainable; however, 
based on the data the program sets incentives that create a stalemate (c.f. Table 4).  
Table 4: Comparison of industry/market factors between bio-refinery and IT industries (c.f., Pacheco-de-Almeida 2010; Hoppe 
and Lehmann-Grube 2001) 
Market factors that risk 
escalation of competition 
FIBIC 
(esp. Bio-refinery) 
DIGILE 
 
Main target market for the RDI 
outputs 
Bio-based products, including 
liquid “bio-fuels” 
Digital business and consumer 
services, digital service 
infrastructures 
Fast moving technology, short 
product cycle 
Biotechnology is science-based. 
The RDI cycle is long but moves 
fast compared to the industry 
standard 
Historically, technology 
development has been fast 
Volatile markets  The market size is unpredictable; 
the assumption is that it is 
growing 
Overall, the market for IT is 
growing steadily, fast changes 
occur within and between 
segments, technologies and 
business models 
High R&D cost Moderate-high R&D cost; high 
investment cost 
Moderate R&D cost; low-
moderate investment in digital 
services 
Well-resourced enterprises Many large multinational 
enterprises 
Large multinational enterprises, 
SMEs 
 
5 Discussion  
To summarize, both of the cases support the proposition of the reverse tragedy of the commons. While it is 
generally assumed that public goods tend to be overexploited, the reverse may be true when the risk of 
escalating competition and low appropriability create ‘perverse’ incentives. Based on the above-discussed 
cases, we consider factors that relate to the enterprises themselves and the framework conditions.  
First, building competitive advantage on a public good is an oxymoron within RBV, as public information is 
not appropriable. In practice enterprises base decision on perceived asset and market position within the 
given appropriability conditions. Thus the likelihood of the reverse tragedy is the highest when the asset 
position is perceived to be equal among the competitors and smaller when the coopetitive enterprises have 
clearly different asset positions and/or roles in the value chain. 
P1: The likelihood of exploiting public IP correlates with the relative (perceived) asset position of the 
focal enterprise among its competitors 
P1a: (Perceived) lack of complementary assets is a disincentive to exploit public IP 
P1b: Poor perceived fit to scope and path of the enterprise is a disincentive to exploit public IP 
P1c: The level of (second order) capabilities to assess the value of innovation and to exploit it 
are in direct relationship with the propensity to exploit public IP 
Second, we propose the likelihood rises when the markets and/or technology are volatile and develop fast, 
entry barriers are low, and RDI costs are high and/or the competitors are well resourced. Similarly, the 
likelihood of escalation with expected low returns create a further disincentive for innovation. Effectively, 
these mechanisms create stalemate whereby enterprises wait, for each other to create a market. Thus, we 
further propose the following:  
P2: The reverse tragedy is exacerbated by risk of escalation of competition that is associated with  
P2a: Fast moving technology and short product cycles, 
P2b: Volatile and/or uncertain market demand,  
P2c: High RDI cost, and 
P2d: An industry that consists of well-resourced enterprises. 
Third, we may consider the factors that are related to the framework conditions that are established by the 
policy mix. The main precondition is low appropriability. The confounding factor is the horizontal nature of 
the consortia, i.e., including competitors from the same tier of the value networks within the consortia.  
P3: Reverse tragedy is enabled by  
P3a: Mandated IP (-R) sharing (in the extreme) or 
P3b: Weak appropriability conditions, and 
P3c: Consortia with partners who are in (direct) competition 
Main limitation to the propositions is that we assume a degree of risk averseness, which is contrary to the 
usual underlying assumption in much of economics. The findings are corroborated by the findings that the 
more open enterprises are and the more intensive their competition, the stronger their preference to 
retain IPR  (Hagedoorn and Zobel 2015), that high R&D costs can lead to a waiting game (Hoppe and 
Lehmann-Grube 2001), and that lower appropriability will lead to lower value creation (Kortelainen et al. 
2011).   
Although the findings of general benefits from OI seem to be robust across different contexts (Dahlander 
and Gann 2010; Laursen and Salter 2006; Chesbrough and Brunswicker 2013; van de Vrande et al. 2009), 
based on this exploratory account, it seems that enterprise as well as industry and market characteristics 
have an impact on how well OI works. OI arguably has or can have multiple societal and economic benefits, 
but ceteris paribus weaker appropriability does not equal greater value creation, at least in the short to 
medium term. The implication for research is that the industry conditions may moderate the benefits of 
opening up innovation. This puts the nascent argument that ‘more open is better’ under a critical light (Ahn 
et al. 2016; Hippel and Krogh 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh 2006; Pénin 2011).  
These behaviors are most likely in the conditions of poor appropriability and/or intensive collaboration. 
Such conditions would possibly suggest an oligopolistic industry in which a few enterprises are substantially 
larger than its network partners and others “cannot afford” not to engage with the network engines. 
Alternative or complementary explanations for these behaviors might include difficulties of overcoming 
organizational inertia, the not-invented-here syndrome, difficulty integrating the RDI and strategic 
alignment between consortium and internal RDI (e.g., West & Gallagher 2006; Dahlander & Gann 2010). 
This exploratory account cannot comprehensively rule out all alternative explanations, but the data suggest 
that the IP appropriability is a decisive factor.  
Another test is the question: why would rational decision makers accept such an agreement while not 
being able to reap the benefit for the investment? In short, the reverse tragedy is a product of a ‘perfect 
storm’ of circumstances. The interviews indicated that the T&C took shape after initial commitment to the 
program. The decision makers operated with the best knowledge they had at the time and ‘promises were 
made.’ Further, the full picture of the relative asset positions and market conditions was revealed during 
the programs. Finally, a widely observed attitude was that due to the exceptional funding volume and 
commitment of several key players none ‘could afford’ to stay out.  
These findings provide insight into the debate on OI. In ‘truly open’ innovation, where all results are public, 
theoretically, the (positive) externalities are the greatest. However, there is a risk of subversive behaviors 
and less incentive to conduct RDI that is related to the core business. Thus, in practice, some balance must 
be sought in openness. We cannot say definitely whether ‘truly open’ (c.f. Hagedoorn & Zobel 2015) 
innovation works, but the findings indicate a that enterprises that come from a traditional IPR-ownership 
paradigm may not be amenable to engage.  
The implication for management is that entering into OI needs consideration of the market and the 
collaborators intent. Even if an enterprise is not worried about their asset position, weak appropriability is 
conducive to poor partner behaviors. The common-sense corollary is to align incentives. Referring to the 
propositions, this includes aligning the strategic interests and asset positions of the collaborators to 
minimize conflict of interest and maximize value creation. 
The parallel implication for policy is that while establishing OI regimes, the interplay between enterprise 
characteristics, industry structure and market framework needs to be considered to avoid a stalemate. The 
SHOK program adhered to the guidelines proposed for OI policies (de Jong, Kalvet, and Vanhaverbeke 
2010), but the outcome is not as favorable as expected and hoped for. If the objective is to implement OI to 
maximize positive externalities, the incentives to engage in RDI and further commercialization of the 
outcomes must be aligned. Consortia formed around shared interests and ‘vertically’ along the value chain 
are likely more effective than large coopetitive consortia. Additionally instruments that support market 
formation and legitimation could lower uncertainty and align incentives for innovation (c.f. Edler and 
Georghiou 2007; Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; Georghiou et al. 2013).  
6 Conclusion 
This paper has presented an exploratory empirical account of a phenomenon that we refer to as the 
reverse tragedy of the commons in an open innovation setting. Our main finding is that that when 
information is a public good between a group of coopetitive stakeholders, asset positions are similar, and 
the industry conditions give rise to the risk of competition, stakeholders tend not to commercialize IP from 
collaborative RDI. The reverse tragedy of the commons is named in this graphic manner because such an 
event not only is costly in terms of time and resources but also can, in fact, render IPR effectively worthless 
in terms of commercial exploitation. Thus such partnerships may actually hinder an industry in the short to 
medium term.  
The main contribution of this paper is that it outlines a new phenomenon that informs management, policy 
making and contributes to exiting research. This finding is especially pertinent in the design of RDI policy 
measures that aim to foster collaboration. The main finding is that forcing partners to share knowledge is a 
double-edged sword. Even though positive externalities may hypothetically be greater, a reverse tragedy of 
the commons may in fact put the industry in a cul de sac as found in the cases.  
The implication for management is that entering into collaboration in OI terms needs consideration of the 
market and industry conditions. In view of the propositions, one key point is alignment of the interests and 
asset positions of the collaborators to minimize conflict of interest and maximize value creation. Another 
key is to consider the incentives set by the policy mix and stress the dimensions of legitimation and market 
formation.  
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